Spooky Grammatical Effects Joseph Davis
The idea in linguistics that the absence of an overt structural element can have real consequences -that nothing can be something -may perhaps forever and rightly be analytically suspect. But it does have a long pedigree and a successful track record. For instance, various null elements have been proposed in phonology, morphology, and grammar. And, in addition to discrete null elements, there are broader types of structural distinctions involving the absence of overt structure. Evidence continues to support the position that structural absence has a role to play in linguistic theory. And linguistics is far from unique in this respect; absence plays roles in such other realms of human experience as physics, mathematics, sport, music, and anthropology.
Any misgivings in linguistics about the absence of substance have august precedent. Albert Einstein's discomfort with the idea in quantum mechanics that measurement of a particle in one place can have an effect on a particle in a completely different place was famously expressed in his phrase "spooky action at a distance." Yet experimental evidence has long since backed up the notion of such "entanglement" of particles. Similarly in linguistics, decades of work have supported the position that nothingness is a force to be reckoned with.
There is no need now, therefore, for a paper laying out a general theoretical consideration of nullity in linguistics, and certainly no need to justify the practical uses that have been made of various nulls. This paper, instead, will trace a development from the very early days of the field to the most recent developments in Columbia School and variationist linguistics. This is the path that leads to the work of Ricardo Otheguy and that stands to inform the work of linguists who will continue to benefit from his influence. This path runs from the American Descriptivist null or zero element in phonological and morphological paradigms, through the empty categories of later formal syntax and -contemporaneously but not compatibly -the organization of Columbia School's grammatical systems, extending then to more recent work that expands Columbia School theory and to Otheguy's own constructive critique of variationist linguistics. In terms of forebears to Otheguy, this treatment will touch upon, among others, Saussure, Bloomfield, Harris, Chomsky, Diver, Labov, and García. Throughout the paper, analogies will be made with other, nonlinguistic human behaviors, in keeping with the view that human language, far from being modular, is instead "entirely consistent with the way any other form of everyday human activity is carried out" (Diver, 1995 ).
The null in mathematics
While quantum mechanics represents human efforts to understand physical phenomena, the null -or empty, or zero -element has played an important role too in fields that deal with human mental concepts. So mathematics, for instance, has its empty set. Consider the three simple equations and the sets of solutions each has in real numbers in Diagram 1. 
The null in semiotics
Conceptual uses of the empty structural element include not only the mathematical but also the semiotic. Consider first baseball and then language.
In baseball, it is the job of the umpire to judge whether each pitch that comes towards the batter is a good pitch or a bad pitch. In the closed semiotic system that is shared by the umpire, the players, and the spectators, that absence of movement by the umpire is significant; it conveys a meaning. Baseball uses a null element.
Linguistics
Linguistic theory has made extensive use of nothingness. This has been the case even though it has long been recognized that languageusers' pragmatic interpretation in discourse goes "beyond what sentences actually say" (Li & Thompson, 1979, p. 312) , even to the point that, according to Ono & Thompson (1997, p. 489) (Diver, 1974 (Diver, , p. 31, 1975 .
Nevertheless, the null in linguistics has been heavily relied upon.
Typically, in lexicon, phonological distinctiveness is crucial for keeping lexical items apart. So bear needs to be pronounced distinctly from beer, if miscommunication is not to ensue. Nevertheless, homonymy -the absence of a phonological distinction -is commonplace in lexicon, as in "bear the burden," "trap a bear," and "bare one's soul" -plus "the undertaker needs another bier." As evidenced by such speech communities as the French and the Mandarin, the human capacity for dealing with homonymy in speech is vast. Homonymy may well be the strongest evidence for what Diver (1975 referred to as a "human factor" in language:
the fact that human intelligence is what allows language to function as well as it does in spite of the semiotic imperfections built into its structure.
In orthography, a writer may use an alphabet to represent meaningful units such as words. To that end, English orthography typically makes use of twenty-six letters, A-Z. Omission of letters, however, may be indicated by an apostrophe, as in isn't (is not) or fo'c'sle (forecastle). The apostrophe, then, is in a sense sometimes an orthographic null element.
Saussure to Bloomfield to Chomsky and beyond
Linguistics has a long tradition of the use of the null element. Saussure (1878 , interpreted in Diver, 1974 proposed for historical Greek a zero alternation with /e/ and /o/ (e.g., leip-/ loip-/ lip-) to account for attested patterns of vowels in IndoEuropean languages. Bloomfield (1926) Structures (Chomsky, 1957, p. 39) , Ø is an option alongside other verbal affixes denoted past, S, en, and ing in a rewriting rule. Then, in
Aspects of the Theory of Syntax, come the dummy element and the null feature (Chomsky, 1965, pp. 103, 155) . These last are purely formal elements of syntax with no phonological or morphological content.
For instance, one "dummy element" serves for "signifying" that the rule of the passive transformation of a sentence is obligatory, and one "null feature" specifies part of the syntactic environment for a selectional rule involving adjectives that can describe humans or not.
The raison d'être of such constructs is to represent a syntactic property, something to do with the structure of sentences, not with the structure of morphemes. Likewise, the principle of "recoverability of deletion" (Chomsky, 1965, pp. 179, 182) (Chomsky, 1982, p. 64) .
Outside of the realm of formal syntax, too, the recognition of significant absence is longstanding, even if the theoretical basis for the recognition has remained largely unquestioned. In both the variationist and the grammaticalization frameworks -not that these are always separate -significant absence (e.g., null, zero, or null instantiation) is supported by some sort of structural paradigm, be it communicative (e.g., rhetorical), semantic (e.g., conceptual), traditional (e.g., the paradigm of grammatical person), or still syntactic.
Taking a feature of discourse -quotation -into account, D'Arcy (2012), in a variationist, diachronic study of English, sees a "null form" as a "strategy" of introducing quotation, alongside such overt lexical material as say, think, go, and (forms of) be like, to which list D'Arcy appends "Other." If lexical items such as these -as opposed to grammatical elements -are members of an "open list" (Diver, 1990 , then such a "null form," rather than constituting a structurally defined element as above, really amounts to the absence of an overt form (see below) in a communicative rhetorical context that is researcher-defined.
As regards the diachronic dimension, Bickel, WitzlackMakarevich, Zakharko & Iemmolo (2015) assume the "structure of agreement paradigms" to frame their cross-linguistic investigation testing a diachronic universal statistical principle involving the development, through grammaticalization, of "zero forms in the third rather than in the first and second person" (p. 30). Here, obviously, the paradigm of grammatical person provides the frame in which a zero form can be posited or assumed. Bybee (1994) , treating "The Grammaticization of Zero,"
proposes that, through usage, something conceptual that is identifiable only in the "universal conceptual space surrounding the communicative context of language use" (p. 251), but not in the linguistic system itself, can develop into a linguistic element that has no phonetic substance but "true semantic content that is equivalent in many ways to" other linguistic elements (p. 242). i Here, not universal syntactic structure but "universal conceptual space" is guiding the postulation of zero.
In a similar vein, but adding a variationist approach too, Torres
Cacoullos & Walker (2009) In variationist linguistics, some version of null is much studied, but typically it is assumed as the realization of a syntactic slot, not fundamentally proposed or questioned as a theoretical entity. For instance, Schwenter (2006), assuming, as did Chomsky, the syntactic framework of sentence structure, treats "null direct object" as an "observation" that is empirically "VARIABLE" in Spanish. ii Tippets (2011) likewise assumes a syntactic framework within which to identify direct objects in Spanish. Within the "envelope of variation" of verbs that occur with "a-marked" direct objects, Tippets compares these tokens with "un-marked or a-less tokens" (excluding other uses of a 'to'). iii Otheguy's term), the view that a subject personal pronoun is "omitted" can ultimately be traced back, perhaps, all the way to the pioneering variationist study of the "deletion" of copula in English by Labov (1969) . Though much that is practical -involving, say, bilingualism, contact, and language acquisition -has been learned through quantitative studies of the phenomenon (as seen in papers in Carvalho, Orozco, & Shin, 2015) , few are those scholars who have questioned, as Otheguy has, whether the absence -or omission or deletion -of a form (such as él 'he') is the same thing, theoretically speaking, as the presence of a null form (). iv As Otheguy points out, the distinction becomes crucial when, for instance, a researcher is concerned, on the one hand, with syntactic factors such as tense and,
on the other, with extra-sentential discourse factors such as continuity of reference (or "switch reference").
The theme in this intellectual history is the power of postulated structure to compel the postulation of null elements to prop that structure up. So if it is postulated that there exist meaningful forms (morphemes) made up of phonological elements (phonemes), then if these entities sometimes turn up (in alternation or in historical development) without those phonological elements, a null alternate of the physically absent sound will serve the purpose of preserving the postulated morphological structure. And if it is postulated that there exist sentences arranged in rule-governed patterns, then if these sentences sometimes turn up without those patterns (e.g., an infinitive clause without an overt subject), an empty category will serve the purpose of preserving the postulated sentence structure. Or if, instead of syntax, semantics is assumed to be universal, then alternation between the overt and the covert can still be deemed to have been "observed." When such statements are made, theory-explicit or not-is driving analysis.
William Diver and the Columbia School
Not to say that analysis ever should or could be purely bottom-up or ad-hoc. Even the iconoclast William Diver (1993 Diver ( , 1995 -who, like Saussure before him, renounced the nomenclaturism of syntax (Otheguy, 2002) This is not to say that it is always easy to decide whether or not to posit a zero signal, but in principle the decision is guided by oppositional structure, as long recognized (e.g., García & Putte, 1989) .
Contini-Morava (2006) wrestles with the question of "The Difference
Between Zero and Nothing" in the context of a Swahili problem.
Certain Swahili noun classes, unlike most of the eleven or so noun classes in that language, lack any identifying overt prefix in certain morphophonemic contexts. Only one of these noun classes, according
to Contini-Morava, should be analyzed as having a zero prefix; the others "simply lack a prefix." This is an analytical decision, not a given. In Contini-Morava's words (p. (Diver, 1995 Regardless of one's confidence in Diver's speculation about the psychological processes of the (proficient) reader of Latin, it is clear that the analyst, in setting up two signals for ablative plural and dative plural, is being guided by structure that is posited elsewhere and deemed to be relevant.
The thinking brings to mind the conception of linguistic structure traceable to Saussure (if through Meillet): a system -un tout en soi (Saussure, 1916 (Saussure, /1972 Oppositions of inclusion are far less common. One is represented by the system of Number in Greek (Diver, 1987 Greek has an opposition of inclusion. Greek has a dedicated signal (the singular) for the meaning ONE and a dedicated signal (the dual) for the meaning TWO, but its signal for numbers such as three, four, and seventy (its "plural"), can be used too when there are only two of something. The Greek meaning OTHER includes the meaning TWO. (This is indicated by the curly bracket.) Diver was fascinated by how the Greek writer, Homer, employed this Number system in accordance with an apparent interest in being precise or not, using the included signal of the meaning TWO for things that were of special interest to him and the including member, the meaning OTHER, for things that were of less interest to him. The point for us, however, is merely that, here again, an element of structure-a precise Number meaning-can be dispensed with. Put another way, a certain element of linguistic structure-the meaning TWO-remains relevant even when it is not signaled, even when the poet opts out of signaling that precise number.
All the structural relations seen so far might be called oppositions of value. In them, a given semantic substance -e.g.,
Number or Relation to a Place -is exhaustively divided up, by signals, into relative values. One value is defined by its opposition to the others, that is, by being not another value in the same semantic substance. We have seen four types of hypotheses in Diver where an element of structure may, at a certain point in the text, be relevantly not present: the null signal, homonymy, the residual member in a system, and the including member in a system.
The opposition of substance
Another type of structural relation illustrates too, in its own way, the relevance of an absence of structure at a certain point in the text. This is the opposition of substance. As defined by Davis (1992 , p. 287, summarized in Davis, 1995 , an opposition of substance is "a relationship in which two signals have certain meanings in common but differ in that one signal entirely lacks meanings from some semantic substance to which the other signal belongs." vi This structural relation was defined in order to account for the distribution in texts of two pronouns in modern literary Italian, egli and lui, both often glossed 'he.' The meanings that egli and lui have in commonand so establish a basis upon which the two pronouns can be related -are: Number ONE, Sex MALE, Referent OTHER THAN SPEAKER OR HEARER (i.e., third person), and Attention LOW (as opposed to more highly demonstrative forms). Where they differ -their opposition of substance -is in that egli, but not lui, also signals a meaning from an additional substance: the meaning CENTRAL in a system of Focus on participants in events. Essentially, egli is restricted to being the subject (not the oblique) of a particular verb, while lui is much more of a free-floater. Consequently, the relevance of egli is tied to a particular event in the narrative, while lui may conceptually relate to something in addition to -or even instead of -an event in the narrative. For instance, lui may suggest a contrast between one man (lui) doing one thing and another man mentioned elsewhere in the context. Such a token of lui would be relevant both to its own verb and to some noun somewhere else in the context.
As can be imagined, the contrast between egli and lui is subtle and requires careful validation. Other oppositions of substance, however, are more readily obvious (given knowledge of the morphology). Davis (2002) The idea of the opposition of substance is carried out more fully in Davis (2017b In this text, the odds of observing si, as opposed to l+, in a chapter (VI) devoted to alphabets and dialects is over twice as high as the odds of observing si in a chapter (XI) devoted to people. Thus, an element of linguistic structure that is present here and absent there in a text has very real, measurable effects on the structure of discourse. Or, at least, the opposition of substance provides an account of such correlations in discourse.
The opposition of substance is one more development in a series of linguistic treatments that point to the relevance of the insubstantial in observable phenomena.
Unsignaled structure in music
Much as the relevance of the opposition of substance finds support in language, so too the relevance of unsignaled structure finds support in semiotics outside of language: in music. This extra-linguistic support is relevant if, as indicated in the introduction to this paper, the facts of linguistic structure resemble importantly, through and through, aspects of other types of human behavior.
Consider modern western musical notation. Analogize a linguistic element (e.g., si) to a certain triad of notes (e.g., GBD) in a musical score; analogize a phrase in a piece of discourse to a musical phrase; and analogize a language-user's grammar (a system of systems) to a whole musical composition. The eighteenth-to-nineteenth-century convention in music was to indicate the key signature of an entire composition just once, at the very beginning of the piece; it is assumed then that that key signature prevails until it is explicitly changed. ix As a result, accidentals -sharps and flats -do not need to be indicated for each note of the perhaps several pages of a western classical or romantic musical composition, but only once.
Wherever the accidentals are not explicitly indicated, they are, actually, missing structures. In terms of performance, this principle of organization entails that a pianist's fingers, for example, will alight on a black or a white key in response to structure that is not signaled at that point in the musical text, perhaps not even on that page of text. Table 2:   Table 2 . Musical triads instantiating multiple compositional keys notes played key of the composition
, a min., G maj., e min., D maj., b min.
• G#-B -D A maj., f# min.
• G#-B -D# E maj., c# min., B maj., g# min., F# maj., d# min.
• G -B b -D F maj., d min., B b maj., g min., E b maj., c min.
•
For the benefit of those who know only that a piano has black keys and white keys: The number of those colors played might be 0, 1, 2, or 3, depending. Now of course a proficient pianist playing a Chopin étude typically will not pause to calculate all this, but the performance -the observable distribution of the movement of the fingers, to put it crudely -gives evidence of his or her implicit knowledge of the semiotic system.
Human beings are capable of operating systematically even when relevant structure is not explicitly signaled.
When there's no there there
In all the linguistic situations surveyed thus far, a posited structure provides a framework within which to posit a theoretically significant absence: homonymy, the null morpheme, the residual member or the including member in an opposition of value, and the opposition of substance. For Chomsky and his followers, that framework is sentence structure; for Diver and his followers, that framework is a grammatical system (e.g., Number, Degree of Control, Focus, Relation to a Place) and the interlocks into which that system enters with other grammatical systems. This structural framework serves as a kind of
analytical control over what gets posited; no linguist would posit a million zeroes all over the place. 
Absence studied from a Columbia School linguistic perspective
Consider the distribution in modern literary Italian of vi and ci, adverbial clitics to the verb, both typically glossed 'there' and sometimes incorrectly viewed as "fully synonymous" (Russi, 2008, p. 57 If we in linguistics ever manage to develop a good understanding of structural absence -homonymy, the null morpheme, the residual member or the including member in an opposition of value, the opposition of substance -then we will be in a better position to understand the absence of structure. That is, understanding when nothing is something would help us to understand when nothing is simply nothing.
Absence studied in variationist linguistics
An essentially comparable approach is taken by Otheguy & Zentella (cf. supra). xiii This is the question of whether we have to do across the board -in both presence and absence -with structure or not. In the review of linguistics traced so far in this paper, a phonetic null was posited by Harris, by Chomsky, and by Diver as a structural element in its own right, the occupier of a slot in a morphological paradigm, in a sentence, or in a grammatical system comprised of meaningful signals.
The opposition of substance too has to do essentially with structure:
the systematic opposition between an element that bears a meaning from some semantic structure (e.g., Italian l+ above, bearing a meaning of Degree of Control) and another element that does not (si).
By contrast, at this point in this paper, the question is, instead, how to treat the overt presence of a structural element versus the mere absence of that element, when the absence of that element is not itself a structural element. There's simply nothing there, much as when one compares an utterance like This is a really muggy night versus This is a muggy night. So, it might be argued, the theoretical reason why Otheguy & Zentella (2012) treat utterances such as Come as the absence of él rather than as the presence of a null subject is because they are analyzing not sentence structure but attested speech.
Without the assumption of the framework of sentence structure, the utterance Come is just the utterance Come, and it contains no él. pronoun (e.g., él) contributes. That insight is possible only if the question is framed in terms of presence versus absence. If "null subject" had its own value -either different from or the same as "overt subject" -then that value -a positive thing -would be competing, as it were, with the value of "overt subject," much as the value of, say él 'he' competes with the value of ella 'she' or with the value of ellos 'they.'
In linguistics, absence is not necessarily the same thing as null.
(As, in mathematics, empty set is not the same thing as the real number zero.)
Conclusion
In linguistics, it can be worthwhile to truck in nothingness. That has been shown to be true in structural linguistics, in formal linguistics, in
Columbia School linguistics, and in variationist linguistics and in grammaticalization. Moreover, as Diver (1995 would have it, language is in some respects like other aspects of intelligent human behavior. So nothingness, if it is important outside linguistics (in mathematics, in sport, and so forth), may be important in linguistics too.
It is a well-known trait of human beings to seek out pattern and even to impute significance where there is none: seeing crabs and bulls in the constellations, finding good luck in a four-leaf clover, or believing in a divine promise on account of a rainbow. This general trait is no doubt an extra-linguistic manifestation of Diver's "human factor" in linguistics. In a finite semiotic system such as grammar, where all the parts of the system interrelate, it is human nature to behave in ways that are consistent with that system, even when overt signaling of elements of the system is abandoned. The semantic side of language does not cease to exist when the phonetic side falls silent.
If this is indeed the way human beings behave when we speak and write, then it will be unavoidable for the linguist sometimes to formulate hypotheses of such insubstantial realities as null signals, homonyms, residual meanings, oppositions of inclusion, oppositions of substance, and indeed to reckon with absence itself.
